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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## 1. FRANCE MAY START NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM IN JULY

Jules Moch, the French delegate to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, has confidentially advised the American delegate that France "will decide in July"

to proceed to make nuclear weapons unless a partial disarmament agreement is imminent. Such an agreement would have to include a "sound basis" for French renunciation of nuclear weapons.

### Comment

France could test an atomic bomb in late 1957 or early 1958

weapons research has been under way for the past two or three years. At least a year to 18 months would be required from the date of decision to manufacture such weapons.

Moch had indicated previously that French conditions for abstaining from making nuclear weapons include (1) similar abstention by West Germany and control over its rearmament, (2) reductions in the Soviet army, and (3) some inspection of the USSR. He has also specified renunciation by the three nuclear powers of further nuclear weapons stockpiling and testing.

Moch views the recent Soviet proposals optimistically, even though this view is not shared by ranking French Foreign Ministry officials. His disclosure to Stassen may therefore be primarily designed to bring pressure on the nuclear powers to reach an early disarmament agreement.

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## 2. KISHI PREPARING JAPANESE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR DEFENSE WEAPONS

Comment on:

[redacted] Prime Minister Kishi's recent statement in the Diet that Japan's military forces can possess nuclear weapons for defense purposes without violating the constitu-

tion appears to have been a carefully calculated move to condition the Japanese public for the eventual arming of Japan's forces with such weapons. Kishi may also hope to gain support for an expansion of Japan's present guided-missile development program.

[redacted] an evolution in Kishi's thinking had been brought about by strong pressure from Japanese defense policy experts such as former admiral Nomura and former prime minister Ashida.

[redacted] Kishi now favors the arming of Japan with nuclear weapons but plans to move cautiously in view of the sensitivity of the Japanese public on nuclear matters.

Kishi's stand conforms to the thinking of many of the conservative leaders who advocate more advanced weapons for Japan's forces and a greater build-up of air and naval forces. Although Kishi has reiterated that he has no present intention of introducing nuclear weapons into Japan, the Japanese press has been sharply critical of the switch from his past absolute rejection of such weapons, and accuse him of trying to create a favorable impression in Washington.

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### 3. USSR APPROVES NEW SYRIAN ARMS ORDER

Comment on:

[redacted] Damascus was informed [redacted] that the Russian command had approved "our complete order." This is the second arms contract which Syria has concluded with the USSR in the past six months. It is probably smaller than the one concluded last November. Most of the \$30,000,000 worth of military items contracted for at that time has been delivered.

[redacted] largest part of the new contract, including incendiary bombs and motor launches--presumably torpedo boats--will be delivered this year. Other equipment for the navy and for three coastal radar stations is to be delivered in early 1958.

In recent months Soviet bloc military aid in the Middle East has been placing increased emphasis on technical aid and training in the use of bloc equipment.

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#### 4. FORMER INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT SUPPORTS AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENTS

Comment on:



In a 16 May speech in Central Sumatra, former Indonesian vice president Hatta supported provincial demands for autonomy and warned Djakarta that prevailing political strife "if allowed to take its own course would lead to anarchy!" He stated that recent actions in the provinces are not "separatist or provincial" but a movement aimed at the development of the whole Indonesian archipelago. Also speaking at the rally was Colonel Simbolon, former commander in North Sumatra, who is believed to be the principal architect of the Sumatran autonomous movement. He echoed Hatta's statement that recent uprisings in the provinces were not aimed at separating the outlying areas from the Djakarta administration.


Hatta, although no longer holding a government post, is still recognized as a national leader. His speech probably will be used by Sumatran leaders to unify the non-Javanese provinces against the Djakarta government in the interest of promoting a return to "federalism," actually a confederacy of Indonesian states.

Although most provincial leaders have no desire to fragment Indonesia, neither do they have any intention of compromising with the Djakarta government on the issue of provincial autonomy. 


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5. LAOTIAN PREMIER PLANS NEW ATTACK ON PATHET LAO PROBLEM



Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's government is not expected to fall as had been anticipated last week.



Souvanna is preparing to deliver a major speech before the National Assembly sometime next week in which he will review his efforts during the past year to reach a settlement with the Pathet Lao and present a "new" plan for breaking the deadlock.

[redacted] this plan will contain some features objectionable to the United States, such as the establishment of a coalition government. It will, however, take a tougher line toward the Pathets, viewing them as suppliants, and will set forth firm conditions for a settlement. [redacted] it will be unacceptable to the Pathets and will probably lead to a complete breakdown of negotiations. Souvanna, who has considered such a possibility, would then turn the problem over to the Geneva cochairmen, or failing to receive satisfaction, would then take it to the UN.

[redacted] this approach to the Pathet problem will obtain the overwhelming approval of the assembly.

Comment

Despite the extensive dissatisfaction with Souvanna Phouma, the prospect of a prolonged political crisis may have dissuaded leading figures from bringing down his government at this time. If Souvanna continues in office, any departure from his earlier policies offering dangerous concessions to the Pathet Lao is likely to be more in form than in substance.

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## 6, PROPOSED ARMY OFFICER TRANSFERS AGAIN BUILD TENSION IN SYRIA

Comment on:

Reports indicate that a new political crisis is building up in Syria over proposed transfers of over 100 army officers. Among those scheduled to be transferred abroad are members of the rival Sarraj and Nufuri factions. Four of the pro-Nufuri and three pro-Sarraj officers are to be sent to the USSR for advanced training, while

Colonel Sarraj, the leftist chief of intelligence, is to be sent to Cairo.

Tension in army circles is increasing because members of the two factions suspect the other of attempting to gain an advantage as a result of the transfers. Actually this program of transfers appears to be a maneuver by the moderate nonpolitical "Damascene" officer group to weaken both factions. Rightist elements believe the net result will be a weakening of Baath (leftist) influence in the army. Leftist officers may feel that any change at this stage would be unfavorable to their interests and might take counter-measures to block these moves.

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**ANNEX**

Watch Report 354, 16 May 1957  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.



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